Introduction
In the pre-dawn darkness of 15 October 2007, dozens of police from the Armed Offenders' Squad and secret Special Tactics Group conducted simultaneous raids across New Zealand. They announced to a startled country that the raids were authorized by warrants issued under the Arms Act 1983 and the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, and that they had broken a network of terrorist training camps centred in the remote Urewera mountains in the centre of the North Island. The seventeen people arrested were not, however, members of an Al-Quaeda sleeper cell. They were all local political activists.
Some had high public profiles. Many were Maori nationalists. The raids drew widespread public condemnation. They were decried as racist political harassment and evidence of the dangers inherent in the anti-terrorism legislation introduced at the behest of the United States in the wake of the airliner attacks of 11 September 2001.
Although the Police had briefed the high-level Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security before the raids, they still required the approval of the Attorney-General in order to prosecute anybody under the Terrorism Suppression Act 1 . When they sought that approval for those arrested during the October 2007 raids, the Solicitor-General announced that, on the basis of the evidence that had been gathered, he could not assent to the charges, and he went on to describe the existing law as 'unworkable'.
In response to this situation, the Government gave the New Zealand Law
Commission the task of examining the crux of the matter: whether existing law needed to be amended 'to cover the conduct of individuals that creates risk to, or public concern about, the preservation of public safety and security and the means of obtaining evidence in relation to that conduct'. It also specified that the Law Commission must take account of the 'the need to ensure an appropriate balance between the preservation of public safety and security and the maintenance of individual rights and freedoms'.
This is an opportune time and the Law Commission the ideal agency to conduct this exercise, named the Public Safety and Security Project. This paper was prepared as a contribution to this project. It traverses some of the key theoretical and practical issues that might underlie the matters under consideration, and identifies challenges and opportunities that present themselves.
The paper begins with a discussion of the definitional difficulty associated with the notion of terrorism, and the political history of attempts to resolve this problem. It then considers the New Zealand's past experience in assessing and managing national security. The next section deals with the tensions that have emerged between anti-terrorism legislation and the criminal law, including a discussion of how such tensions might be resolved; whether, for example, the solution is to adjust the criminal law so as to better equip it to deal with the challenge of terrorism, or to maintain a divide between antiterrorist legislation and criminal law. In the final section, I scrutinise the 'balancing' approach that the Law Commission has been set, noting that some serious criticisms have been raised about models that seek to balance national security considerations on one hand and individual freedoms on the other.
I conclude by identifying a number of ways in which the Law Commission might learn both from the experience of New Zealand and other countries in combating terrorism, and from the extensive body of academic scholarship in this area. I also raise the possibility of whether New Zealand's special position may enable it to develop anti-terrorism legislation with an orientation as independent as its anti-nuclear policies. In doing so, New Zealand may be able to respond to the threat of terrorism no less effectively than any other country, but without having to compromise basic freedoms and the rule of law. I argue that, to the extent that there are such fundamental compromises made, they should occur only with the informed consent of the public.
Defining and Making War on Terrorism
Nine days after the attacks of September 11, US President George W Bush declared a 'war on terror'. In a speech to the Joint Session of Congress he characterised it in these terms:
'Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen… We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United
States as a hostile regime' 2 .
Given the close attention it has attracted, it is remarkable that terrorism has proved such a difficult concept to define with precision. This difficulty can be illustrated by the fact that it remains undefined even in the most important current international anti-terrorism resolution, UN Security Council
Resolution 1373 (which was passed just 17 days after the September 11 attacks). Lord Carlile, who was commissioned to produce a report for the British Parliament in 2007 entitled 'The Definition of Terrorism', found a wide range of ways that various national jurisdictions and international conventions and resolutions have dealt with the topic, and noted that 'there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism' 3 . Moreover, he concluded, having read many attempts at defining the concept, 'there is (not) one that I could read as the paradigm' 4 .
The term 'terrorism' was first used at the time of the French Revolution to describe the system of terror administered by the Jacobins 5 . It was later broadened from being exclusively used in relation to state-instigated terror as a means of controlling its own population to also include, as its modern '… to insist on direct proof of a specific threat to Canada as the test for "danger to the security of Canada" is to set the bar too high. There must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada. But the threat need not be direct; rather it may be grounded in distant events that indirectly have a real possibility of harming Canadian security'.
In previous periods when national security is perceived to have been under grave threat, the judiciary has given differing views on how national security and individual freedoms should be reconciled. During the sustained IRA security to be of greater importance than individual freedoms, saying 'great as is the public interest in the freedom of the individual and the doing of justice to him, nevertheless in the last resort it must take second place to the security of the country itself'. However conceptually or strategically attractive the argument about New
Zealand's global responsibility may be in the current response to terrorism, it is eerily similar to the intelligence and security discourse of the Cold War.
The enemy during the decades of the Cold War was communism: it was a phenomenon depicted as a system and a way of life that was anathema to our own, which had global designs for imposing itself on the world, possessed the capacity to destroy us (and indeed the entire planet), and was sufficiently callous and untrustworthy for us to be in no doubt that it could well do so. If the suicide bomber could be the person next to us on the bus, the reds could have been at home under our beds. At the same time, the electronic footprints generated by, for example, 'cookies' embedded within web browsers, the replacement of cash in favour of electronic transactions for commercial exchanges, and the routinisation of both visible and clandestine digital security cameras in the public and private sphere create unprecedented possibilities for the construction of intricate profiles of people's personal lives. Moreover, it has become routine practice for computer equipment, cell phones and other digital devices to be seized and subjected to forensic examination as part of police investigations.
One common feature of all of these technological developments is that they lend themselves to interception, storage and analysis. This has the effect of enhancing to an extraordinary degree the capacity of intelligence agencies to . That is, the prosecution must prove the motive behind an act and not just the intention to commit the act itself. She notes that motive is normally taken into consideration at the sentencing stage, rather than in determining whether to assign criminal responsibility. Moreover, although one might agree with the reasoning behind UN Resolution 1624 that terrorist acts should be condemned 'irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by whomever committed', it does not follow that an act that is carried out with basic criminal motivation should be considered a less serious offence than the same act that is carried out with an ideological or religious motivation, however misguided that might be.
The ideological component of terrorist acts also has a major impact on the legal system well before any prosecution. There is a degree of public scepticism of the competence and political bias of New Zealand's intelligence agencies which is derived from the perception of their actions in relation to previous incidents. Important among these was the break-in by the NZSIS to the home of an opponent of neoliberalism at the time of an APEC Trade Ministers' meeting in 1996. The break-in occurred less than two weeks after the passage of the first amendment to the NZSIS Act since the end of the Cold War. One of the changes to the Act was to broaden the scope of the service to concern itself with not just traditional concepts of terrorism and subversion, but also activities that 'impact adversely on New
Zealand's international well-being or economic well-being' 69 .
Critics of the legislation argued that this gave the service licence to spy on political activists such as opponents of the neoliberal restructuring of New Zealand that had been pursued since 1984. Such concerns were dismissed and the public was assured that the amendments were to make it possible for the SIS to defend the country against modern threats such as industrial and economic sabotage. Assurances were also given that, with the simultaneous creation of the office of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, any citizens who feared that they were being unfairly or illegitimately harmed by threshold required for obtaining refugee status in New Zealand. However, upon his arrival in the country, the NZSIS had issued him with a risk security certificate under the provisions of the Immigration Act. While claiming that
Zaoui's presence in New Zealand posed an unacceptable risk to national security, the service refused to release to Zaoui or his lawyers any of the information they were relying on in making that assessment. Neither would they disclose the source of that intelligence. Zaoui's avenue of appeal against the service was through the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.
He was, therefore, expected to reply to accusations about him the content of which was not known to him, and in doing so to rely on the offices of the Communist success, a set of outcomes which were so bad that they justified the restrictions of free speech to be found in the Act, even though the chances of such a revolution were slight'
83
. Gearty also notes that Ackerman does not explain why the criminal law cannot cope with the challenge of a cataclysmic terrorist attack, even if it does represent an assault on the effective sovereignty of the state 84 .
Others, while not going as far as Ackerman, also advocate a response to terrorism that sits outside the criminal law. Cohen, for example, argues that 'a bright line be maintained between national security intelligence gathering activities and ordinary criminal investigation'. This is based on the view that what he sees to be the imperatives of intrusive national security powers should be kept quarantined from the normal legal process process. He warns that without it, 'our ability to protect the ordinary criminal justice system from the tainting effects of activities or techniques used in the national security sphere will be compromised' , were not all related to subversion, but were handled by the branches of the police that dealt with the bulk of the terrorism cases and had developed a culture that 'fostered a particular kind of policing'
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. This is consistent with the warning of Cole and Lobel that, once the clarity of certain 83 Gearty, 'The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Volume 0, 2008, p.6. 84 Ibid., p.8. 85 Cohen, 2006. Op. cit., p.54. 86 Kennedy. Op cit., p.32. 87 Birmingham is in the West Midlands. 88 Ibid., p.33.. prohibitions is lifted, 'officials will be likely to interpret "emergency situations" broadly and emergency powers will be increasingly used in 'And now we live in a world where we must accept the costs associated with protecting ourselves form terrorism.. There will always be a trade-off between national security and individual rights.
The task of government is to recognize these trade-offs and preserve out security without compromising basic rights and liberties' Hocking makes the point that striking the wrong balance between national security and personal freedoms may even be counter-productive in that those most readily identified as 'terrorist candidates', that is, those who would be most likely to be the subjects of the extra powers of the police, might become so alienated and marginalised that they may in turn become sympathetic or even potential recruits to the terrorists' cause 98 .
Others, however, go further by calling into question the whole 'balancing' approach that underlies much scholarly writing and public discourse associated with combating terrorism. Bronitt 99 and Michaelsen 100 and challenge the notion that civil liberties can or should be balanced against national security; that in order to save liberal democracy from the threat posed to it by international terrorism, we must strike a balance between security and liberty.
Michaelsen's argument is that 'the assertion that civil liberties need to be balanced against the interests of national security is, at best, misleading and, at worst, structurally wrong'
101
. He mounts a series of inter-related reasons to support this view and proposes a helpful alternative to the balancing approach.
Michaelsen's philosophical objection is based on a rejection of the notion that a citizen is able to enjoy civil liberties only in the context of a secure environment which cannot be achieved without expanding the powers of the state through anti-terrorism legislation. Decades before terrorist acts were unequivocally condemned by being declared unacceptable in any circumstances, human rights were agreed to be unequivocally essential in that no circumstance could justify their being compromised. However, it does not follow from a categorical condemnation of all terrorist acts that it should be permissible for strategies to prevent such attacks to compromise basic rights. Furthermore, as Michaelsen notes, far from being an obligation on the state to protect the physical integrity of its citizens, the 'right to liberty and security of person' that is referred to in the ICCPR is designed as a means of 'confining the power of the state to coerce individuals through arbitrary arrest and detention' 106 . Such a depiction of security policy as an integral dimension of a commitment to upholding basic human rights conceals the fact that, as Michaelsen puts it, 'it is a defining characteristic of liberal democracy that security policy is normatively bound to the rule of law and to human rights; it is not an end in Roach makes the point that, while the criminal sanctions of the anti-terrorism legislation may act as a deterrent to third parties who might otherwise offer assistance to terrorists, the deterrent effect on the terrorists themselves is highly questionable 109 terrorist activity is carried out by suicide bombers. Waldron shares this view and poses the question of whether, even if they do succeed in increasing the likelihood of convicting and punishing terrorists, compromises to due process do enhance security. Without a deterrent effect, he argues, it is possible that such legal 'victories' could make it 'more rather than less likely that the country punishing the suspect is subject to terrorist attack'. Therefore, he argues, the reasons for punishing the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are not ones of security but of justice 'and those reasons of justice may not be as separate from the scheme of civil liberties that we are currently trading off as the "new balance" image might suggest' 110 . What is required but has been lacking to date, insists Michaelsen, is 'a detailed enquiry into whether a diminution of liberty actually enhances security or whether one is trading off civil liberties for symbolic gains and psychological comfort' The task that the New Zealand Law Commission has been set is a similar challenge to that facing other countries around the world. The contemporary threat of terrorism is testing the capacity of liberal democracies to maintain their security whilst upholding basic freedoms and the rule of law. However, there is also a sense in which this provides a unique and valuable opportunity both for New Zealand itself and for the international community. Seven years after the September 11 attacks, there is a wealth of theoretical and empirical material to review, particularly if the terms of reference are interpreted less as a balancing exercise than as a proportionality test. It would be more possible now than seven years ago, for example, to assess the actual effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures. Similarly, more informed judgments are now able to be made as to whether it really is impossible to combat terrorism within the confines and established principles of criminal law.
The Law Commission is ideally placed to conduct a thorough review of all of New Zealand's anti-terrorist legislation in itself and in its application. This article, through its discussions of the failure of the Inspector-General to recognise that the law had been broken in relation to the APEC case as well as the conflict between Section 12 of the Terrorism Suppression Act and the nulla poena principle, has revealed examples of possible conflicts between the pursuit of national security and adherence to important legal methods and principles. Reference has been made to three particular examples; the APEC incident, the Zaoui cases and the October 2007 anti-terrorism raids. Each of these is highly instructive, raising a wide range of fundamental issues including the separation of powers, public accountability, the right to political dissent, the politics of policing, and freedom of the press. These examples could also be examined to assess the effectiveness of safeguards such as the NZBORA which, despite being introduced in an earlier, less digitised and less intrusive era, still contains the weakening provision of Section 4(b).
With some distance from the horror of the September 11 attacks, and nothwithstanding the Bali, Madrid, London, Mumbai and other terrorist atrocities in the interim, the Law Commission is also in a position to use as one of its starting points an assessment of the actual risk that terrorism poses to New Zealand. This would enable it to assess, for example, what differences there may be between an anti-terrorism strategy that is oriented to address the risk to New Zealand as compared with one that has been designed for countries with a far greater likelihood of being a terrorist target. It could, for example, propose a comparable approach to New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance with a political and legislative framework that is designed to meet New Zealand's own specific needs and mitigate the actual threats that it faces. In doing so, the Law Commission might consider a range of ways for New
Zealand to fulfil its obligations as a global citizen, one of which might be to develop an anti-terrorism model that could be adopted by other low-risk countries, including its Pacific neighbours whom it has already pledged to support.
In conducting its review, the Law Commission also has the benefit of being able to draw on a vast body of excellent legal scholarship, only a small part of which has been able to be included within the scope of this article. With its legal expertise and without the politicians' vulnerability to political polls, the Law Commission is ideally placed to conduct this review. By being able to identify what legal principles are at stake and why they are important, the Law Commission should be able to ensure that, if Parliament does ultimately decide to continue to compromise and/or further compromise any basic freedoms of New Zealanders in the name of national security, it at least does so deliberately and explicitly and can be judged by the public accordingly. In this regard, however, if the people of New Zealand are able to make a meaningful judgment, to give their informed consent, there may be a need for a process of public consultation and education for them to fully appreciate and comment on what is at issue. Such a process would be appropriate given the importance of the matters under consideration, and its engagement of the public would be in keeping with what international commentators have identified as one of the most positive aspects of New Zealand's anti-terrorism approach to date.
